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Commentary
RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES TO EMERGENCY
EVACUATION UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
WILLIAM C. HOLLIS III
On September 11, 2001, the world awakened to a new face of
terror. Terrorists hijacked and piloted commercial jets and then
slammed them into New York City's World Trade Center and the Pen-
tagon.' Within the next hour both towers collapsed, killing over three
thousand people. 2 It was not until later that the public learned of the
special horror that was endured by the Twin Towers' disabled commu-
nity.3 Although they may have been located below the level of impact,
for many of them their fate was the same as that of the able bodied
above the crash sites. While tales emerged of heroes who delayed
their own flight to safety to assist, and even carry,4 people with disabili-
ties down scores of flights of stairs, we also learned that, sadly, other
people with disabilities waited in vain for rescue teams to reach them.'
Unlike the able-bodied, the disabled did not have an avenue of escape
that they could negotiate independently. They were not able to use
the fire stairwells. The elevators were inoperable or unsafe. People
with disabilities waited because they had no other option.6
The deaths of many at the World Trade Center who waited help-
lessly for rescue illuminate the daily fears of many in the disabled com-
1. See Ellen Wulfhorst, World Trade Center Attacked, Towers Collapse, REUTERS ( Sept. 11,
2001) at http://www.news.lycos.com/news/story.asp?section=breaking&storyld=241490.
htm.
2. See Lost But Not Forgotten, USA TODAY.COM (Nov. 11, 2001) at http://www.usatoday.
com/news/nation/2001/09/1 1/death-toll.htm.
3. See Barbara McKee, Local Comment: Don't leave disabled behind, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Oct. 18, 2001) http://www.freep.com/voices/columnists/emckeel8_20011018.htm. The
author is a disabled person who writes on disability issues. Her October 18, 2001, opinion
piece paints a moving picture of the fear evoked in a mobility-impaired person by such a
commonplace event as a stuck elevator. She writes that, "We are, in fact, reduced to the
helplessness of an infant in times of crisis. A set of stairs reminds us just who we are. A fire
alarm announces to us that we are completely dependent on altruism. We feel the fear
begin in our gut, hoping that just one person will be our Good Samaritan today." Id.
4. See Editorial/Opinion: Reflections on a Week of Terror, USATODAY.COM (Sept. 13, 200 1)
at http://www.usatoday.com/news/comment/2001-09-14-nceditf.htm.
5. See Wulfhorst, supra note 1.
6. See McKee, supra note 3.
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munity.7 A wheelchair bound person does not have to be in a
skyscraper to be imperiled by fire. For such an individual, a fire in a
two-story building is just as deadly if no means of egress other than the
elevator exists.8 For many people safe evacuation has only recently
become an issue. For the disabled community, most particularly the
mobility impaired, the lack of emergency egress is a recurrent
nightmare.9 Common fires and even periodic fire drills highlight the
inadequacies of the current schemes devised to safeguard people with
disabilities.
Unfortunately, when Congress was given a dramatic forewarning
of the danger faced by the disabled community, it failed to recognize
it. Following the World Trade Center bombing on February 26, 1993,
Congress held hearings to examine the issues brought to light by the
bombing. Much of the testimony focused on the heroism many New
Yorkers exhibited that day.'0 Congress heard testimony detailing the
actions of individuals who delayed their own escape to assist disabled
co-workers to safety. In the course of these hearings, the plight of the
disabled in the building became known. "One woman, whose disabil-
ity confines her to a wheelchair, was passed from person to person
until she was safely on the street outside."'" A paralyzed man was car-
ried down "dozens of flights of stairs through smoke so thick you
could not see your shoes" to safety. 12 The heroes of the day were ap-
propriately lauded.1 3 Commendably, Congress recognized the need
to examine emergency preparedness systems.' 4 However, the inher-
ent peril faced by the disabled community was neither highlighted
nor addressed.15 Consequently, the evacuation of people with disabili-
ties in the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, was no better
accomplished than it had been on February 26, 1993.16 While others
escaped down the stairways, people with disabilities waited and prayed
for a Good Samaritan, or failing that, ultimate rescue by firefighters. 1
7
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See generally 139 CONG. REc. Hl159-01 (1993). On February 26, 1993, terrorists ex-
ploded a van filled with explosives in an underground parking garage underneath the
World Trade Center. This disaster resulted in five fatalities and over one thousand injuries.
Id. at 1160.
11. Id, at 1159.
12. Id. at 1160.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See generally Wulfhorst, supra note 1.
17. See, e.g., McKee, supra note 3.
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Ironically, just before the September 11 disaster, in August 2001,
the White House convened a task force to plan for emergency evacua-
tion of people with disabilities. 8 Its work has taken on a sense of
increased urgency.' 9 The task force members include disability rights
advocacy groups, government agencies, fire protection and emer-
gency associations, and the White House.2 The task force will address
the need for legislation, updating emergency preparedness informa-
tion at the state and local level, and communication. 21
This paper seeks to answer pressing questions highlighted by the
attacks on September 11: What can people with disabilities reasonably
expect regarding safe evacuation during emergencies? Does the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) confer upon people
with disabilities the right to an opportunity to survive equal to that
afforded the able-bodied in an emergency? And, what impact will the
Supreme Court's upcoming ruling in Chevron USA, Inc., v. Echazabal
have on the use of the "direct threat" defense by employers and public
accommodations to discriminate against people with disabilities be-
cause of concerns over their safe evacuation?
Part I of this paper examines the current state-of-the-art of emer-
gency planning to protect mobility-impaired persons, including appli-
cable building codes and fire safety plans. Part II discusses the courts'
interpretations of the ADA, with emphasis on issues of safety and
emergency evacuation. Part III traces the evolution of the "direct
threat" doctrine to the upcoming Supreme Court decision in Chevron
USA, Inc. v. Echazabal, and its potential application to emergency evac-
uation of individuals with disabilities. Part IV reviews the application
of the ADA to issues of emergency evacuation and analyzes the poten-
tial impact of the Supreme Court's upcoming Echazabal decision.
18. Minutes of the Task Force'on Emergency Preparedness and People with Disabili-
ties, (October 4, 2001) (on file with the author). The task force has established the follow-
ing goals for the disability community and related groups: "For the President to establish a
Task Force within the Homeland Security Office (HSO) to deal with emergency issues for
people with disabilities; to generate ideas and issues that the HSO should tackle; to estab-
lish principles and/or checklists for use when establishing evacuation and other emer-
gency preparedness, response and recovery plans; to get into the consciousness of leaders
* . . to involve people with disabilities.. Id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Minutes of the Meeting of the Emergency Preparedness and People with Disabili-
ties, p. 3 (September 28, 2001) (on file with the author).
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I. IMPACT OF THE ADA ON BUILDING CODE REQUIREMENTS FOR
EMERGENCY EVACUATION OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
A. The ADA and the Model Building Codes
The ADA prohibits discrimination against a person based on
physical, mental or developmental disability in decisions on employ-
ment, the provision of public services and transportation, or the provi-
sion of services by public accommodations.22 It sets accessibility
standards2 3 when public entities2 4 and places of public accommoda-
tion 25 renovate existing facilities or construct new facilities.2 6 To pro-
vide technical assistance and guidance to entities undergoing
renovation or new construction, Congress charged the Architectural
and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (Access Board) with
development of minimum guidelines and requirements for accessible
design. 27  The Americans with Disabilities Act Access Guidelines
(ADAAG) provide the starting point for standards issued by the De-
partments of justice (DOJ) and Transportation (DOT) to enforce the
law. 28 Buildings and facilities covered under ADAAG must also meet
the technical requirements specified in the provisions of the Ameri-
can National Standards Institute standards for accessible design (ANSI
Al17.1). 29
State and local planning laws govern new construction and reno-
vation of existing buildings." ° Ninety-seven percent of the jurisdic-
tions in the United States that have adopted and enforce a building
22. See generally Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(1990). See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12163, 12204 (1990). Public entities and places of public accommoda-
tion are required to conform to the Minimum Guidelines and Requirements for Accessible
Design developed by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (1990). "[A] "public entity" [is] - (A) any State or local govern-
ment; (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a
State or local government; and (C) . . . any commuter authority...."
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1990). The ADA defines public accommodations as private enti-
ties affecting commerce. It lists numerous categories of private entities as examples of pub-
lic accommodations. See § 12181(7).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12146-12147, 12183 (1990).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12204 (1990).
28. See 36 C.F.R. § 1191.1 (2001); seealsoAccess Board, TheAmericans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, at http://www.access-board.gov/about/ADA.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2001) (on
file with the author); 28 C.F.R. § 36.406 (2001).
29. 36 C.F.R. § 1190.40 (2001). Requires compliance with, American National Stan-
dard for Building and Facilities-Providing Accessibility and Usability for Physically Handi-
capped People (ANSI A117.1-1986).
30. See Sara Yerkes, International Code Council, Sorting Fact From Fiction About ICC -
NJTA (Oct. 25, 2001), at http://www.intlcode.org/SaraICC-NFPA.html (on file with the
author).
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code use one of three model-building codes.3" Those model codes
address emergency design and evacuation, and incorporate by refer-
ence ANSI Al17.1 standards for accessible design. 2 In 1994, the
three model code organizations established the International Code
Council (ICC) " to coordinate the development of a single set of com-
prehensive national model construction codes.34 The ICC issued the
first set of codes for the built environment in 1999."5 State and local
jurisdictions nationwide are updating their building code require-
ments from the predecessor documents to the 2000 edition of the in-
ternational codes.36 The three model code organizations no longer
produce their respective codes.3 7 ICC has updated the ANSI Al17.1
standard to comply with ADAAG.38 Consequently, the International
Building Codes adopted by state and local governments comply with
ADAAG and reflect the ICC's current state of fire safety philosophy
for the disabled population.
B. "Defend in Place" is the Predominant Theory of Fire Safety for People
With Disabilities
Modern fire safety planning and emergency evacuation plans ad-
dress the "normal or typical fire in a building."39 The plans seek to
protect people caught in fires that occur with deadly frequency, and
31. See id.
32. See, e.g., BUILDING OFFICIALS & CODE ADMINISTRATORS INTERNATIONAL, INC. (BOCA)
Chapter 10 § 1007.0 (13th ed. 1996).
33. International Code Council, About the ICC (Oct. 25, 2001), at http://
www.intlcode.org/abouticc.htm (on file with the author). The three model code organiza-
tions that comprise the ICC are: Building Officials and Code Administrators International,
Inc. (BOCA); International Conference of Building Officials (ICBO); and the Southern
Building Code Congress International, Inc. (SBCCI). Id.
34. See id.
Since the early part of the last century, these nonprofit organizations developed
the three separate sets of model codes used throughout the United States. Al-
though regional code development has been effective and responsive ... the time
came for a single set of codes. The nation's three model code groups responded
by creating the International Code Council and by developing codes without re-
gional limitations - the International Codes.
Id.
35. See Yerkes, supra note 30.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. New ICC/ANSI Al 1 Z 1-1998 Standard Now Available, INTERNATIONAL CODE COUNCIL,
(Oct. 25, 2001), at http//www.intlcode.org/standards/newal 17.htn. "ICC/ANSI Al 17.1-
1998 has been developed to work in harmony with Federal accessibility laws, including...
the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG)." Id.
39. See NFPA ONLINE, Strategies in Building Evacuation Messages (2001), at http://
www.nfpa.org/BuildingCode/Building-Evacuation/buildingevacuation.asp (on file with
the author).
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take more than four thousand lives each year." "Defend in place" has
evolved as the dominant plan for safeguarding people in high-rise
building fires, and people with disabilities located where evacuation is
problematic due to their physical limitations.4 ' It includes construc-
tion of areas of rescue assistance that utilize fire retardant construc-
tion materials, active fire suppressants (e.g. sprinkler systems), and
emergency means of egress.42
The risk of death or injury from fire is greater for people with
physical, mental or sensory disabilities." Because people with disabili-
ties may have difficulty negotiating emergency "means of egress"
44
where such escape is available to the able-bodied, separate plans seek
to address their needs. Those plans most often rely on a "defend in
place" strategy.45 In Section IV of this paper, the author will argue
that "defend in place" has a discriminatory effect on people with disa-
bilities because, under some circumstances, it requires that they re-
main at risk while the able-bodied evacuate the danger area.
All locations required by the ADA to be accessible to people with
disabilities must have at least one accessible means of egress.4 6 The
model codes require that an "accessible means of egress shall provide
a continuous path of travel from a required accessible space to a pub-
lic way which is usable by a mobility impaired person and shall include
40. United States Fire Administration, Fire Stops With You. Removing the Barriers: A Fire
Safety Factsheet for People with Disabilities and their Caregivers (2001), at http://
www.usfa.fema.gov/safety/fswy22.htm (on file with the author).
41. See NFPA ONLINE, supra note 39.
42. See generally BOCA Chapter 10 (1996), supra note 32. The BOCA standards are
referenced here as indicative of the standards of the three model codes.
43. See id.
44. BOCA Chapter 10 § 1002.0 (1996), supra note 32. "Means of egress" "[is] a continu-
ous and unobstructed path of travel from any point in a building or structure to a public
way. A means of egress consists of three separate and distinct parts: the exit access; the exit;
and the exit discharge. A means of egress comprises the vertical and horizontal means of
travel and shall include intervening room spaces, doors, hallways, corridors, passageways,
balconies, ramps, stairs, enclosures, lobbies, horizontal exits, courts and yards."
Id. (emphasis omitted).
45. See NFPA ONLINE, Strategies in Building Evacuation Messages (2001), available at http:/
/www.nfpa.org/BuildingCode/Building-Evacuation/building-evacuation.asp (on file with
the author). The National Fire Protection Association posted a message on its website in
the wake of the September 11 th terrorist attacks defending the current emergency evacua-
tion plans and building code standards. Those standards are based on strategies that are
proven to maximize the safe egress and/or protection of people during fires. See also
NFPA ONLINE, NFPA Overview (2002), at http://www.nfpa.org/Home/AboutNFPA/
NFPAOverview/NFPAOverview.asp (on file with the author). Founded in 1896, the Na-
tional Fire Protection Association has over seventy-five thousand members representing
nearly 100 nations. It serves as the world's leading advocate of fire prevention and is an
authoritative source on public safety.
46. See BOCA, supra note 32, § 1007.0.
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accessible routes, ramps, exit stairways, elevators, horizontal exits or
smoke barriers. ' 47 To meet this requirement buildings must be de-
signed to utilize one or more of the means listed.4 8 "An accessible
means of egress is one that complies with these guidelines and does
not include stairs, steps, or escalators."4 9 "Areas of rescue assistance
or evacuation elevators may be included as part of accessible means of
egress. 50
For example, in order to be considered an accessible means of
egress, an exit stairway must conform to approved dimensions and ei-
ther incorporate an area of rescue assistance within an enlarged story-
level landing or be accessible from an area of refuge or a horizontal
exit.5' ADAAG defines an area of rescue assistance as "an area, which
has direct access to an exit, where people Who are unable to use stairs
may remain temporarily in safety to await further instructions or assis-
tance during emergency evacuation. "52
Horizontal exits enable people to evacuate the fire danger area
by moving to a safe location on the same floor level. 5' Depending
upon circumstances, horizontal evacuation may be far safer than at-
tempting vertical egress via stairways.5 4 By moving to an area of refuge
the mobility impaired person can remain in relative safety for a period
of time.55 A safe evacuation can occur provided the rescue team
reaches the area of refuge before the fire compromises the protective
structures. "Defend in place" avoids more losses than would occur if
the mobility impaired attempted self-evacuation under existing condi-
tions. 56 The strategy, however, does not afford the mobility impaired
an opportunity at egress equal to that provided the able bodied
through ICC fire safety standards.
1. Emergency Evacuation Technology
Under some circumstances, emergency evacuation technology of-
fers an alternative to the "defend in place" strategy. Items such as
47. BOCA, supra note 32, § 1007.1; see alsoADAAG, 28 C.F.R. § 3.5 Definitions (1998).
48. See id.
49. ADAAG, 28 C.F.R. § 3.5 Definitions (1998).
50. Id.
51. See BOCA, supra note 32, § 1007.2.
52. ADAAG, 28 C.F.R. § 3.5 (1998); see also ADAAG, 28 C.F.R. § 4.3.11 (1998).
53. See BOCA, supra note 32, § 1002.1.
54. See NFPA ONLINE, supra note 39.
55. See id.
56. See id.
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escape chutes, slidescapes, 7 and controlled descent devices provide
escape routes in some towers and special manufacturing environ-
ments.58 United States based codes neither permit nor recommend
these technologies for commercial and public buildings.59 Such de-
vices do not come close to the level of protection provided by the
other code-mandated features.60 Additionally, the descent devices
raise a moral dilemma. Fire stairwells are not designed to accommo-
date both descent devices and "[t]he necessary egress width for indi-
viduals who descend the stairs under their own power."'" Because the
descent devices partially obstruct the stairway, one person could im-
pede the descent of many hundreds.62  Consequently, the devices
may create more danger than they relieve.
The technology that comes closest to providing effective evacua-
tion of people with disabilities is the emergency evacuation elevator.
These elevators utilize standby power and are protected by smoke
proof doors and automatic sprinkler systems.63 Emergency evacua-
tion elevators are required in buildings that have a vertical separation
of four or more stories between the accessible area and the level of
exit discharge.64 When other systems are present that reduce the
overall risk of fire, however, building owners may elect to forego in-
stallation of emergency evacuation elevators. Buildings equipped
throughout with automatic sprinkler systems, for example, are exempt
from the requirement to have an emergency egress elevator.6 5
Emergency evacuation elevators are, however, problematic from
both planning and operational perspectives. Use of elevators by peo-
ple with disabilities is not practical during emergency events, because
" [e]levator use is difficult to control and it is unlikely that able-bodied
persons could be kept off an elevator if they thought it would get
them to the ground more quickly.66 There is simply no mechanism
that can preserve elevator use to those who need it most. '' 67 Including
evacuation elevators in the emergency egress plan is also problematic
57. See BOCA, supra note 32, § 1002.1. BOCA defines a slidescape as "[a] straight or
spiral chute, erected on the interior or exterior of a building, which is designed as a means
of egress direct to a street or other public way." Id.
58. See NFPA ONLINE, supra note 39.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See BOCA, supra note 32, § 1007.3.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. NFPA ONLINE, supra note 39.
67. Id.
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for firefighters who do not like to use elevators because of their inher-
ent danger.6" Elevators are designed to go to a predetermined recall
level when a fire occurs.6 9 If there is a malfunction of any type, the
elevator may inadvertently travel to the fire floor with potentially
deadly results for its occupants. 70 Consequently, mobility impaired
persons are dependent on the "defend in place" strategy.
7 1
II. INTERPRETING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
Congress enacted the ADA "to provide a clear and comprehen-
sive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities. '72 The ADA essentially borrows its defini-
tion of "person with a disability" from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 7s
Under the ADA, "l[t] he term "disability" means with respect to an indi-
vidual - (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record
of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an im-
pairment. '74 The statute regards people with mobility, sight or hear-
ing impairments as having a disability because the impairments
substantially limit the major life activities of walking, seeing and hear-
ing.75 The ADA prohibits a "public entity" or "place of public accom-
modation" from discriminating against an individual with a disability,
because of that disability, in access to employment, programs or
76
services.
When enacting the ADA, Congress found that discrimination
against people with disabilities takes many forms. 7 7 Congress specifi-
cally identified "[o]utright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory
effects of architectural, transportation and communication barriers,
overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to ex-
isting facilities and practices, . . and relegation to lesser services, pro-
grams, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities" as
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See NFPA ONLINE, supra note 39.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b)(1) (1990).
73. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990).
75. See Albertson's Inc., v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 563 (1999). Supreme Court held
that a truck driver suffering from amblyopia was not per se a person with a disability under
the ADA but must prove the disability on a case-by-case basis by showing a substantial limi-
tation on a major life activity. Id. at 564.
76. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12182 (1990).
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (1990).
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discriminatory practices. 78 Congress also included in the language of
the statute its recognition of the pervasive discriminatory effect of
overprotective rules and policies that stem from paternalistic atti-
tudes.79 "Paternalism is perhaps the most pervasive form of discrimi-
nation for people with disabilities and has been a major barrier to
such individuals."80 The ADA defines such paternalistic actions as dis-
criminatory and outlaws them. People with disabilities are concerned,
however, that well-meaning people will revert to overprotective mea-
sures to achieve enhanced fire safety."s
Congress intended that the courts construe the ADA to grant at
least as much protection as is provided by the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.82 The Rehabilitation Act of 197383 "prohibits a federally funded
state program from discriminating against a handicapped individual
solely by reason of his or her handicap. ' 84 Recent jurisprudence illus-
trates the consistent application of this Act to actions invoking both it
and the ADA.85
A. The ADA Mandates a Strong Bias for Accessibility
The following cases illustrate that the purpose of the ADA is to
provide equal access to existing programs and services.86 The ADA
does not require the creation of new services or benefits to equalize
the effect of those 'programs or services.87 Title II and Title III of the
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(II), part 2, at 74 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
356.
81. See Albert R. Hunt, Those Suffering Special Stress, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at A27.
82. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998); See also 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (a)
(2001).
83. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2001).
84. School Bd. of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 275 (1987) (holding
that a school teacher diagnosed with tuberculosis is an individual with a disability under
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
85. See, e.g., Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that City of New
York's denial of client's requests for extra-program services were not discriminatory under
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act); Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 931 F. Supp. 688
(D.Ariz. 1996), affd, 157 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding the city liable under both the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the ADA for failing to provide emergency telephone com-
munication system compliant with Department ofJustice technical assistance manual); Shi-
rey ex rel. v. City of Alexandria School Bd., 229 F.3d 1143 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
plaintiff failed to prove that the school board unlawfully discriminated against a person
with a disability, under both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act of 1973, when it did not
provide an effective evacuation for a disabled child during an emergency).
86. See 28 C.F.R. § 36 (2001).
87. See Wright, infra note 96.
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ADA require public entities88 and places of public accommodation, 89
respectively, to remove barriers to accessibility. This may be achieved
through modifications in policies, practices, or procedures unless do-
ing so would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. 9' Additionally,
public accommodations shall utilize auxiliary aids and services, 91 and
remove architectural barriers,9 2 if necessary, to ensure that no individ-
ual with a disability is excluded or denied services.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the ADA to ban location-
based discriminatory action of states as violating the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when rational basis for such
action does not exist. In Olmstead v. L. C.,93 the Supreme Court ruled
that unjustified isolation is discrimination. The Court cited Congress'
identification of unjustified "segregation" of persons with disabilities
as a "for[m] of discrimination"94 in reaching its determination.95 In
doing so, the Supreme Court has proscribed physical segregation of a
qualified individual with a disability when such segregation is based on
that disability.
Federal courts have consistently interpreted the ADA as prohibit-
ing discrimination in access to services and facilities. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a series of three
cases, distinguished between making reasonable accommodations to
assure access to an existing program and providing additional or dif-
ferent substantive benefits. In Wright v. Guiliani,96 the court affirmed
the district court's denial of the plaintiff's request for a preliminary
injunction to require the City of New York to provide adequate emer-
gency housing.97 The plaintiffs, five HIV positive individuals living in
emergency shelters, alleged that the city's failure to provide adequate
housing to accommodate their disabilities constituted disability dis-
88. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (2001).
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1990).
90. 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a) (2001).
91. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 (2001).
92. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304 (2001).
93. 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999). O1mstead concerned two developmentally disabled people
who sued the state of Georgia under the ADA. They alleged that Georgia discriminated
against them based on their disabilities by denying them community placement in lieu of
institutional placement. The Court found that unjustified segregation constituted discrimi-
nation under the ADA and held that the patients were qualified for community-based treat-
ment, but that the state could take into account the available resources in determining
whether patients were entitled to immediate community placement. Id.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (1990).
95. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600.
96. See Wright v. Guiliani, 230 F.3d 543, 548 (2d Cir. 2000).
97. See id. at 549.
534 [VOL. 5:524
RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
crimination.9" The court held that the ADA and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 do not require the city to provide benefits
in addition to those already afforded by the program.99 The court
cited the Supreme Court holding in Alexander v. Choate,"° ° in which
the Court rejected the argument that the Rehabilitation Act guaran-
tees the handicapped "equal results" from government initiatives. t0 1
In an earlier interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme
Court "[s] truck a balance between the statutory rights of the handi-
capped to be integrated into society and the legitimate interests of
federal grantees in preserving the integrity of their programs; while a
grantee need not be required to make 'fundamental' or 'substantial'
modifications to accommodate the handicapped, it may be required
to make 'reasonable ones.''t°
In Rodriguez v. City of New York, the court rejected an ADA chal-
lenge based on the city's failure to provide safety-monitoring devices
to a subset of individuals with disabilities, reasoning that the ADA re-
quires only that a particular service provided to some not be denied to
disabled people. t 3 The ADA does not mandate that states provide
services to persons with disabilities that it does not already provide to
others.'0 4 Distinguishing Olmstead, the court observed that, "In Olm-
stead, the parties disputed only-and the Court addressed only-where
Georgia should provide treatment, not whether it must provide it...
Olmstead ... holds only that States must adhere to the ADA's nondis-
crimination requirement with regard to the services they in fact
provide." i05
The Second Circuit introduced this line of reasoning in the 1998
case Doe v. Pftommer.1 ° 6 In Pfrommer, the court rejected a Rehabilita-
tion Act and ADA challenge to the adequacy of the vocational educa-
98. See id.
99. See id. at 548. The Second Circuit explained, "that the disabilities statutes do not
require that substantively different services be provided to the disabled, no matter how
great their need for the services may be. They require only that covered entities make
"reasonable accommodations" to enable "meaningful access" to such services as may be
provided, whether such services are adequate or not." Id.
100. 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (holding Tennessee's proposed reduction in allowable days of
hospitalization under the state's Medicaid program did not violate the Rehabilitation Act).
Id.
101. See id. at 304.
102. Wright, 230 F.3d at 547-48, citing Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300, (citing Community Col-
lege v. Davis, 442 U.S. 367, 412-13 (1979)).
103. See 197 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 1999).
104. See id.
105. Id. at 619. (internal quotations omitted).
106. 148 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1998).
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tion benefits provided to the plaintiff by the City of New York.1"7 The
plaintiff alleged that the city did not make reasonable accommoda-
tions for his mental illness because it failed to provide additional ser-
vices not then included as program benefits. 0 8 In concluding that
the plaintiff was challenging the adequacy of his benefits, not illegal
disability discrimination, the Second Circuit explained that "[i] t is im-
portant to bear in mind that the purposes of the [ADA and Rehabilita-
tion Act] are to eliminate discrimination on the basis of disability and
to ensure evenhanded treatment between the disabled and the able
bodied."' 9 Wright, Rodriguez and Pftommer illustrate the theory that
even when states provide services and programs equally to people with
disabilities, a disparate impact may result, and that disparate impact is
permissible.
Not all jurists agree that disparate impact is permissible even
where no disparate treatment is intended. In his dissent in Tyler v.
City of Manhattan, Judge Jenkins of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit distinguished disparate treatment from dispa-
rate effect. 110
Disparate treatment occurs when a defendant treats some peo-
ple less favorably than others because of an impermissible
criterion, such as [disability] - conduct from which one may
infer an intent to discriminate. Disparate impact occurs when
a facially neutral practice adversely affects members of a pro-
tected group more than others regardless of whether such
adverse impact was actually intended.'
Title II of the ADA creates for state and local governments an
affirmative duty to act to remove barriers and take other steps to
achieve accessibility.112 Judge Jenkins noted that "[C] ongress recog-
nized that discrimination against the disabled is often the product of
indifference rather than animosity."113 He concluded that, "[e]ffect,
and not motivation, should be the touchstone of an ADA claim."" 4
107. Id.
108. Id. at 81.
109. Id. at 82.
110. 118 F.3d 1400, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming the district court's ruling that com-
pensatory damages for mental and emotional injury are not available to plaintiffs under
Title II of the ADA absent intentional discrimination. The plaintiff did not plead inten-
tional discrimination). Id. at 1400.
111. Id. at 1405.
112. See id. at 1407.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1408 (quotations omitted).
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In Layton v. Elder, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that the Montgomery County, Arkansas court-
house had violated Title II of the ADA.115 In Layton, the district court
had found that even though one of the two plaintiffs had in fact been
denied access to the county courthouse due to the inaccessibility of
the second floor courtroom, that the county had made dutiful pro-
gress to remedy the asserted violations." 6 The Eighth Circuit re-
versed the district court's ruling. 7 In so doing, the court declared
that the "threat of irreparable harm" to the plaintiff and the strong
"public interest" favoring accessibility heavily outweighed the harm to
the county of having to make its services accessible.118 This case pro-
vides a clear example of the imperative for accessibility.
B. ADA Counterbalances to the Accessibility Requirement
The ADA includes several doctrines that serve as counterbalances
to the argument for accessibility. "Reasonable accommodation" and
"undue hardship" under Title I are good examples of such
counterbalances.
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination against people with
disabilities who are otherwise qualified for employment.1 9 Employers
with fifteen or more employees may not discriminate against qualified
individuals with disabilities. 2 ' A qualified individual with a disability
is an individual who, "[w] ith or without reasonable accommodations,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires." '121 Under the ADA employers must
reasonably accommodate the disabilities of qualified applicants or em-
ployees, including modifying workstations and equipment, unless un-
due hardship would result.122
115. 143 F.3d 469, 472-73 (1998). "Appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief"
for alleged violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. At issue was the county court-
house. The second floor courtroom was not accessible, preventing appellants from partici-
pating in programs held therein. Id. at 470.
116. Id. at 471.
117. Id. at 472-73.
118. Id. at 472. The Eighth Circuit explained, "Once a party has demonstrated actual
success on the merits, the court must balance three factors to determine whether relief is
appropriate: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the harm to be suffered
by the nonmoving party if the injunction is granted; and (3) the public interest at stake."
Id.
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1990).
120. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (2002); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2001).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8) (1990).
122. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2 (o), 1630.9 (2002).
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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) cre-
ates implementing regulations and enforces Title 1.123 The EEOC de-
fines undue hardship "[w]ith respect to the provision of an
accommodation" as "significant difficulty or expense incurred by a
covered entity . . 124 Several factors may be used to determine
whether a proposed accommodation is an undue hardship, including
the expense of the accommodation and the relative ability of the or-
ganization to absorb that expense.1 25
In the context of fire safety, ADAAG and ICC require that public
and commercial buildings incorporate design and construction stan-
dards facilitating "defend in place" protections. 126 Because all new
construction must conform to ADAAG and ICC requirements for fire
safety and evacuation, compliance imposes no additional financial
burdens on employers. Consequently, the undue hardship defense is
relatively unavailable to employers in the context of fire safety and
evacuation accommodation.
Title II and Title III include factors that modify an organization's
requirement to offer accessibility to its programs and services. The
Attorney General enforces Title 111,27 so accordingly, the Department
of Justice (DOJ) creates implementing regulations. 128 Title III re-
quires "[m] odificatio [n] of policies, practices or procedures" if "read-
ily achievable" and "necessary to afford the public accommodation's
good [s]" and services to individuals with disabilities. 1 29 Modifications
that would "fundamentally alter" the nature of the programs or ser-
vices, however, are not required. '3  Barrier removal is required where
it is "readily achievable;"'' that is, "[e]asily accomplishable and able
to be carried out without much difficulty or expense." 3 2 Alterations
to existing facilities to accommodate people with disabilities are to be
made to the "maximum extent feasible." ' 3 In light of the strong bias
towards accessibility, the DOJ has interpreted "maximum extent feasi-
ble" to apply to "the occasional case where the nature of an existing
facility makes it virtually impossible to comply fully ..
123. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116, 12117 (1990).
124. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (p) (2001).
125. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (p), (i), (v) (2001).
126. See NFPA ONLINE, supra note 39.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 12188 (1990).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12186 (1990).
129. 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a) (2001).
130. Id.
131. 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(a) (2001).
132. Id.
133. 28 C.F.R. § 36.402(a) (2001).
134. 28 C.F.R. § 36.402(c) (2001).
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C. Safety is a Motivating Factor for ADA Compliance and Enforcement
The safety of disabled people has been a powerful argument for
compliance with the ADA. In Campos v. San Francisco State Univer-
sity,135 the court found a cause of action under the ADA and the Reha-
bilitation Act when disabled students alleged that the university
provided facilities to the disabled students that were less safe than
those provided to other students.136 Citing Students of California School
for the Blind v. Honigt 37 the court held that the state is required to
make the school as safe for its students with disabilities as other Cali-
fornia schools are for their non-handicapped students." 8 In Morgan
v. State of Idaho Department of Public Works, the Supreme Court of Idaho
held that the state was liable for injuries sustained by a blind man who
fell off a loading dock after exiting an elevator through doors that
were not marked with appropriate ANSI tactile signage.
139
Potential safety concerns also prompt judicial enforcement of the
ADA. In Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 4° the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona ruled that the city violated the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act when it installed TDD telephones in its 911 system
that did not comply with the requirements set forth in regulations
promulgated by the DOJ.1 4 1 The court found that "[t]he overriding
concern of the" DOJ's regulations as they related "[t] o this case is that
a public entity's communication with a hearing impaired person be
'as effective as [its] communication with others."' 1 4 2
D. The ADA Does Not Mandate Equal Access to Emergency Evacuation
Neither the ADA nor its implementing regulations specifically ad-
dress the right of people with disabilities to safe evacuation during
135. Campos v. San Francisco State Univ., No. C-97-2326 MMC, 1999 WL 1201809
(N.D.Cal. June 26, 1999).
136. Id. at *1. The plaintiffs "[a]lleged that SFSU maintains physical barriers to students
and faculty that use wheelchairs and/or who have mobility impairments and that these
physical barriers deny such students and faculty safe and equal access to programs, facili-
ties, services, and activities" in violation of Tide II of the ADA. Id.
137. 736 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1984).
138. Id. at 547.
139. 124 Idaho 658 (Idaho 1993).
140. 931 F. Supp. 688 (D.Ariz. 1996), affd, 157 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998).
141. See Ferguson, 931 F. Supp. at 694 (holding that the city failed to provide "direct
access" to 911 emergency services for individuals who use TDD. Id. "Direct access" means
that emergency telephone services can directly receive calls from TDD's and computer
modem users without relying on outside relay services or third party services." Id. at 694,
n.1; see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.161-162 (2002).
142. Ferguson, 931 F. Supp. at 694; 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (2002).
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emergencies.' 43 Although the ADA prohibits discrimination against
people with disabilities in access to programs and services, it does not
require the delivery of programs and services that are identical to
those provided the able bodied.'44 A public accommodation must
modify its programs or services to enable their provision to people
with disabilities. 14 5 Yet, when life and death are at stake even minor
differences in programs can have catastrophic consequences to the
recipients. Does the ADA require equality of access to an emergency
evacuation plan or an equally effective evacuation?
In Shirey ex rel. Kyger v. City of Alexandria School Board, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court
ruling denying injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive dam-
ages to the plaintiffs after finding that the school board had devel-
oped a reasonable evacuation plan for disabled children. 4 6 In this
case, a bomb threat forced the evacuation of the middle school where
the plaintiff was a student.147 The plaintiff, a severely mobility-im-
paired child, was left in the evacuated building for seventy minutes.' 4
Following that incident the school developed an emergency evacua-
tion plan incorporating a "safe area" in the library.149 During an un-
scheduled fire drill the plaintiff was again left alone for a brief period
of time.'-"
The plaintiff and her parents sued under the ADA and the Reha-
bilitation Act, contending that the plan did not provide adequate
evacuation procedures and, consequently, illegally discriminated
against disabled students. 15' The court narrowed the scope of inquiry
to "[w] hether the School Board's actions have denied...disabled stu-
dents access to the program in question-namely, safe evacuation
from school buildings during an emergency." 52 The plaintiffs had to
prove that they were "[e]xcluded from safe evacuation procedures
during an emergency." 55 The court concluded that the school had
provided the plaintiff access to an evacuation plan comparable to the
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2001).
144. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.302 (2001).
145. See id.
146. Shirey ex rel Kyger v. City of Alexandria School Bd., 229 F.3d 1143, *6 (Table), No.
99-1127, WL 1198054 (4th Cir. Aug. 23, 2000).
147. See id. at *1.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at *2.
151. See id.
152. Shirey ex reL Kyger v. City of Alexandria School Bd., 229 F.3d 1143, *5 (Table), No.
99-1127, WL 1198054 (4th Cir. Aug. 23, 2000).
153. Id.
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program offered its non-disabled students and, consequently, did not
discriminate.' 54
In so holding, the court equated actual evacuation with evacua-
tion procedures. Thus, the court moved from requiring safe evacua-
tion to access to safe evacuation procedures. Consequently, the
Fourth Circuit has interpreted the ADA and Rehabilitation Acts as not
requiring that disabled persons have equal access to actual safe evacu-
ation during emergencies.
E. The Effect of Paternalism; Good Intentions Gone Wrong
When drafting the ADA, Congress recognized the pervasive and
invidious nature of paternalistic views of disabled people and the dis-
criminating effect of actions resulting there from. 55 "Paternalism is
perhaps the most pervasive form of discrimination for people with dis-
abilities and has been a major barrier to such individuals." '56 The
legislative history of the ADA is replete with testimony decrying the
discriminatory effects of paternalistic actions taken by state and local
governments, public accommodations and employers.' 5 7 Many dis-
criminatory laws and practices have at their base a rationale protective
of people who are presumed by society to need greater protection
than the norm.15 8  This paternalism results in pervasive
discrimination. 1'59
Before the ADA was enacted the Supreme Court referenced Con-
gress' concern about the discriminatory impact of paternalism. In
School Board of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that what prompted the amended definition of "handicapped
individual" in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was Congress' rec-
ognition that significant discrimination against the handicapped
stemmed from "archaic attitudes and laws," and from "the fact that
the American people are simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the
difficulties confront[ing] individuals with handicaps." 6 ° The awful
154. See id.
155. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), part 2, at 74 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
356.
156. Id.
157. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 6, 8-9, 15-16 (1989).
158. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 7 (1989). "Discrimination also includes . . . patronizing
attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and pernicious mythologies." Id. "These injustices co-
exist with an atmosphere of charity and concern for disabled people." Id. at 15.
159. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), pt. III, at 74 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
356.
160. 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987).
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truth of this contention is evident in the myriad paternalistic laws and
regulations currently in force.
Despite relatively recent recognition of the deleterious effects of
paternalism, many discriminatory laws are still on the books. 6 ' Com-
monly, zoning ordinances reflect the good intentions, "[p]atronizing
attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and pernicious mythologies" that
often result in discrimination against people with disabilities.' 6 2
Three cases illustrate the pernicious effects of paternalism on
people with disabilities. In Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow, Ohio, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit struck down ex-
tensive zoning laws designed to protect developmentally impaired
people residing in single-family homes. 163  The court found that
" [t] he City's 'blanket' fire and safety restrictions applied to all homes
wherein developmentally disabled persons live, regardless of the indi-
vidual abilities of the residents, are based on false [and] overprotec-
tive assumptions about the needs of handicapped people, as well as
unfounded fears of difficulties about the problems that their tenan-
cies may pose.
'64
In Potomac Group Home Corporation v. Montgomery County, Md., the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland observed that,
"[w]hile state and local governments have authority to protect safety
and health, and to regulate use of land, that authority has sometimes
been used to restrict the ability of individuals with handicaps to live in
communities."165
161. See, e.g., Buckhannon v. West Virginia Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 19 F.
Supp. 2d 567 (N.D.W.Va. 1998); Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County,
Md., 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1294 (D.Md. 1993).
162. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 7 (1989).
163. See 974 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1992). The case concerned a challenge to the city's zon-
ing ordinance imposing special safety requirements for a home housing four mentally re-
tarded adult women. The ordinance required the installation of a whole-house sprinkler
system with alarms, fire retardant wall and floor coverings, lighted exit signs above all door-
ways, push bars on all doors, fire. extinguishers every thirty feet, and smoke alarms even
though each of the four women is fully ambulatory, able to hear, and is sighted. They will
live with a house parent hired by their parents. Id. at 45, n.1.
164. Id. at 47. The court instructed the city that "[I]t may impose standards which are
different from those to which it subjects the general population, so long as that protection
is demonstrated to be warranted by the unique and specific needs and abilities of those
handicapped persons." Id. Consequently, the court interpreted the FHAA to allow hous-
ing ordinances intended to protect developmentally disabled people so long as individual
assessments are conducted and the requirements are tailored to the specific needs of the
individual in question. Id.
165. 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1294 (D.Md. 1993). The court granted the plaintiff's motion
for summaryjudgment on the grounds that the county's "exceptional person" rule, requir-
ing individuals residing in a group home to be able to exit from the home on their own in
the event of a fire or other emergency, was overbroad and not tailored to the specific
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In Buckhannon v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, the United States District Court for Northern District of West
Virginia held state statutes and regulations requiring residential based
care home (RBCH) residents to possess the ability to remove them-
selves, termed "self-preservation," from situations of imminent danger
violated the ADA and the FHAA. 16 6 The court found that, "statutes
that single out for regulation group homes for the handicapped are
facially discriminatory." 167
In Marbrunak, Potomac Group Home Corporation, and Buckhannon
disabled individuals had to overcome discriminatory laws in order to
reside in their community. Whether the ordinances required onerous
fire safety systems or the demonstrated ability to "self-preserve," "ex-
ceptional people" were effectively barred from equal access to com-
munity living. These cases illustrate the truth of one of Congress'
findings when enacting the ADA. Senator Kennedy, reporting for the
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, provided, "The
discriminatory nature of policies and practices that exclude and segre-
gate disabled people has been obscured by the unchallenged equa-
tion of disability with incapacity and by the gloss of good
intentions." 6 ' Discrimination against the disabled is embedded in
the bedrock of our laws; mortared in with the good intentions of a
caring but misinformed society.
Years of struggling against paternalistic attitudes and actions con-
dition the disabled to be typically "fiercely independent."' 69 "People
with disabilities . . . do not wish to alter their lives from those of the
health and safety needs of individuals. See id. at 1300. Consequently, the court held that
the rule violated the FIAA. See id. at 1301.
166. 19 F. Supp. 2d 567 (N.D.W.Va. 1998), affd on other grounds, 203 F.3d 819 (4th Cir.
2000), cert. dismissed in part, 531 U.S. 1004 (2000), affd, 532 U.S. 598 (2001). The court
denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss, finding that
the plaintiffs had stated a claim under both the FHAA and the ADA. See 19 F. Supp. 2d 567.
The plaintiffs argued that the statute was facially discriminatory under both acts because it
subjects a protected group, handicapped people, to "explicitly differential" treatment. See
id. at 571. The court reasoned that the regulation is not facially neutral because it is not
generally applicable. See id. The defendants argued that the "self-preservation" regulations
are rationally related to the legitimate state interest of ensuring the safety of other RBCH
residents, staff, and firefighters. See id. at 572. The court found this argument inapposite
to the motion to dismiss. See id. The West Virginia legislature subsequently eliminated the
"self-preservation" requirement in the statute.
167. Id. at 571 (citing Larkin v. Michigan Dep't of Social Servs., 89 F.3d 289, 290 (6th
Cir. 1996)).
168. S. RPe. No. 101-116, at 15 (1989) (quotations omitted).
169. See United States Fire Administration, Fire Stops With You. Removing the Barriers: A Fire
Safety Factsheet for People with Disabilities and their Caregivers (2001), at http://
www.usfa.fema.gov/safety/fswy22.htm (on file with the author).
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general public."' 7 ° There is a danger in this mindset, however, for it
"[c]an mislead them to ignore their special safety needs." '71 It is in-
deed perplexing that the misplaced good intentions that engender
overprotective, paternalistic actions, may result in an outcome diamet-
rically opposite of that intended - a mindset, prevalent in the most
risk vulnerable members of society, that causes them ignore risks in
order to maintain a sense of equality.
III. THE "DIRECT THREAT" DOCTRINE
The "direct threat" doctrine, as it has been incorporated into the
ADA, is likely to have a substantial impact on the disabled community
in the context of emergency egress. Essentially, the direct threat doc-
trine provides a defense under Title I to a claim of employment dis-
crimination when an employer believes that employment of an
otherwise qualified " [i] ndividual with a disability poses a direct threat
to the health or safety of others."'7 2 Under Tide III, a place of public
accommodation may deny access to an individual with a disability
based on the belief that the "[i]ndividual poses a direct threat to the
health or safety of other [s]" by virtue of his disability.173
In February 2002, the United States Supreme Court heard argu-
ments in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazabal in order to resolve a split
among the circuits. The issue in Echazabal is whether the direct threat
defense may be asserted in an employment discrimination dispute
where the direct threat is to the future health of the person with a
disability." 4 A finding by the Echazabal Court that an employer may
deny employment to an individual with a disability based on the belief
that such employment may pose a direct threat to that individual's
health or safety could result in employment denials over concerns
about emergency evacuation of the individual with a disability. A re-
view of the evolution of the direct threat doctrine is warranted here
given the impact that the Echazabal ruling may ultimately have on ac-
cess to employment and places of public accommodation where emer-
gency evacuation of people with disabilities is problematic.
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (1990).
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (1990); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(a) (2001).
174. See Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000), cert.
granted, 122 S. Ct. 456, 151 L. Ed. 2d 375 (Oct. 29, 2001).
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A. Origin of the "Direct Threat" Doctrine
The direct threat doctrine had its genesis in cases involving chal-
lenges under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15 In Dothard v. Rawlin-
son,'7 6  the Supreme Court established the principle that an
individual's right to be free from discrimination in employment based
on sex may not be absolute. 177 In cases where sex is a bona fide occu-
pational qualification (BFOQ), a member of the non-favored sex may
be denied employment. However, when the bona fide occupational
qualification is predicated on concerns of safety, the exclusion of one
sex must not be based on concerns about the safety of the individual
but rather on whether those concerns over safety are "reasonably nec-
essary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise." 
178
The Supreme Court in UAW, et al., v. Johnson Controls, Inc., further
addressed discrimination in employment based on concerns about the
health and safety of third parties. 1 79 In Johnson Controls, the Court in-
175. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); UAW et al., v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
176. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). Rawlinson applied for a job with the Alabama Board of Cor-
rections as a correctional counselor at an all male maximum-security prison. See id. at 323.
After her application was rejected she brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 alleging that she had been denied employment because of her sex in violation of
federal law. See id. The Supreme Court held that in the particular circumstances of the
case, sex is a bona fide occupational qualification and that exclusion of women from the
employment position in question is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
prison. See id. at 336-37. The court explained that the particularly dangerous environment
of Alabama's male maximum-security prisons was a determining factor in finding that sex
was a BFOQ. See id. The Court noted that, at that time Alabama's maximum-security pris-
ons were structured in a dormitory style and that sex offenders were interspersed with the
general prison population. See id. The prisons, characterized as having "rampant violence"
and a "jungle atmosphere," were considered "constitutionally intolerable." See id. at 334.
177. See id. at 335. The Court noted that danger to a woman herself does not justify
discrimination. Id. However, "the essence of a correctional counselor's job is to maintain
prison security." Id. The presence of a woman in a prison as operated at that time by
Alabama, would pose a real threat not only to the woman but also to the basic control of
the penitentiary and the protection of its inmates and other security personnel. Id. at 336.
The Court noted the tension between safety concerns and the individual's freedom to
decide whether to accept risk. See id. at 335. "In the usual case, the argument that a partic-
ular job is too dangerous for women may appropriately be met by the rejoinder that it is
the purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman to make that choice for herself." Id.
178. See id. at 333. While the Court disposed of state hiring criteria purporting to mea-
sure strength through the proxies of height and weight requirements, it nonetheless up-
held Regulation 204 mandating male correctional counselors in contact positions within
maximum security prisons. See id.
179. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). The Supreme Court invalidated Johnson Controls' policy ex-
cluding fertile women from jobs with lead exposure. See id. The employment in question
involved the manufacturing of batteries. See id. After the company experienced above nor-
mal lead blood level tests of pregnant women in battery manufacturing positions it insti-
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validated an employer's fetal-protection policy that excluded fertile fe-
male employees from certain jobs because of concern for the health
of the fetus the woman might conceive.18 °
The Johnson Controls Court reiterated two important principles:
paternalistic rulemaking intended to protect a suspect class of employ-
ees is inappropriate when not narrowly focused to support the central
mission of the business; and employees have the right to decide
whether or not to accept the personal risk inherent in a job. There-
fore, a direct threat to the health or safety of a third party posed by
the distinguishing factor (e.g., sex, pregnancy, disability) may be a
valid justification for discrimination when the third party is indispen-
sable to achievement of the business' mission. The Johnson Controls
Court noted for example, that ajustifiable reason for denying employ-
tuted a ban on their employment in those positions. See id. The union challenged the
policy under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin applied a business necessity defense, obviating
the need for a bona fide occupational qualification analysis, and granted summary judg-
ment to Johnson Controls. See id. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en
banc, affirmed the decision and the reasoning of the district court. See id.
180. See id. The Court noted that despite scientific evidence that exposure to high con-
centrations of lead was debilitating to men as well as women, Johnson Controls' policy
offered men a choice as to whether to risk their reproductive health that was not extended
to women. See id. at 197. Women were excluded from lead-exposed jobs unless they pro-
vided proof of their incapacity of reproduction. See id. at 197-98. The Court found that the
policy created a facial classification based on gender, and that it was facially discriminatory
under Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. "Section 7 03(a) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), prohibits sex-based
classifications in terms and conditions of employment, in hiring and discharging decisions,
and in other employment decisions that adversely affect an employee's status." Id. at 197.
"An explicit gender-based policy is sex discrimination under Section 703(a) and ... may be
defended only as a BFOQ." Id. at 200.
The Court explained that in order for a policy of sex-based discrimination to be per-
missible it must qualify as a BFOQ reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise. See id. citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). The Supreme
Court has interpreted the BFOQ defense narrowly. See id. at 201. Writing for the Court,
justice Blackmun explained that use of the term "occupational qualification" narrowed the
meaning of the BFOQ defense to qualifications that affect an employee's ability to do the
job. See id. "[I]n order to qualify as a BFOQ a job qualification must relate to the 'es-
sence,' or to the 'central mission of the employer's business.'" Id. at 203 (citing Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977); Western Air Lines, Inc., v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413
(1985)). The unconceived fetuses of Johnson Controls' female employees, the Court
noted however, are neither customers nor third parties whose safety is essential to the
business. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 203. Justice Blackmun concluded that the safety
exception is limited to instances in which sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the
employee's ability to do thejob. See id. at 204. "In other words, women as capable of doing
their jobs as their male counterparts may not be forced to choose between having a child
and having a job." Id. And importantly, "[d]ecisons about the welfare of future children
must be left to the parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to the
employers who hire those parents." Id. at 206.
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ment to a pregnant flight attendant is her inability, by virtue of her
pregnant condition, to adequately conduct an emergency evacuation
of an airliner.' 8  The concern in that instance is for the safety of the
passengers, third parties who are indispensable to the air transporta-
tion business.'8 2 Courts addressing this issue have "pointedly indi-
cated that [decisions about] fetal, as opposed to passenger, safety
[were] best left to the mother."'8s
B. "Direct Threat" Under the ADA
Congress included the direct threat language in the ADA to cod-
ify the United States Supreme Court's ruling in School Board of Nassau
County, Fa. v. Arline.'8 4 In Arline,1 5 the Supreme Court recognized a
need to balance the interests of people with disabilities against legiti-
mate concerns for public safety.' 8 6 In the wake of Arline, Congress
amended the Rehabilitation Act and the Fair Housing Act to incorpo-
rate language excluding individuals who would constitute a direct
threat to the health and safety of other individuals.'87 The legislative
history of the ADA reflects Congress' awareness of the relationship
between paternalism and discrimination against people with disabili-
181. See id. at 202-03.
182. See id.
183. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 202.
184. Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F.Supp. 342, 345 (D.Ariz. 1992).
185. School Board of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). The issue in
Arline was whether a person afflicted with tuberculosis, a contagious disease, may be consid-
ered a "handicapped individual" within the meaning of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, and, if so, whether such an individual is "otherwise qualified" to teach elementary
school. See id. at 275. The Court found that Arline had been dismissed from employment
not because of her diminished physical capabilities, but because of the threat that her
relapses of tuberculosis posed. See id. at 281. Recognizing that few aspects of a handicap
give rise to the same level of public fear and misapprehension as contagiousness, the Court
nevertheless held that the fact that a person with a record of physical impairment is also
contagious does not suffice to remove that person from coverage under § 504. Id. at 285-
86. The Court remanded the case to the district court to conduct an individualized inquiry
as to whether Arline was otherwise qualified for the job of elementary school teacher. Id.
That inquiry, the Court observed, must include an examination of whether a reasonable
accommodation will eliminate the risk of infection of others. Id. at 288, n. 16.
186. Anderson, 794 F. Supp. at 345. The Court explained that although the contagious
aspect of Arline's tuberculosis and her physical impairment each resulted from the same
underlying condition, tuberculosis, an employer should not seize upon the distinction be-
tween the effects of the disease on others and the effects of the disease on a patient, and
use that distinction to justify discriminatory treatment. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 282. Further,
the employer may not discriminate against a handicapped person on the generalized basis
that the handicapping condition poses a significant health or safety risk to others. See id. at
287. An individual assessment must be conducted. Id.
187. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998).
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ties. Addressing the issue directly, Senator Kennedy, a co-sponsor of
the ADA stated:
The ADA provides that a valid qualification standard is that a
person not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of
other individuals in the workplace-that is, to other coworkers
or customers. ... It is important, however, that the ADA specif-
ically refers to health or safety threats to others. Under the ADA,
employers may not deny a person an employment opportu-
nity based on paternalistic concerns regarding the person's
health.... That is a concern that should rightfully be dealt
with by the individual.... 8 8
Following passage of the ADA, several cases arose concerning dis-
crimination resulting from application of its "direct threat" doc-
trine. "'8 9 These cases address the application of the direct threat
doctrine when the threat is to the health or safety of others. Because
they demonstrate the principles upon which application of the direct
threat doctrine relies, these cases illustrate the conditions under
which the "direct threat" doctrine may justify discrimination against
individuals with a disability when emergency evacuation is the issue.
1. Whether dispersed wheelchair seating in theaters creates a
"direct threat?"
In order to discriminate against an individual with a disability on
the basis that such individual poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of others, the determination that the disabled person poses a
direct threat must be made on an individualized basis,' the risk to
188. 136 CONG. REc. S9684-03, at S9697 (1990) (emphasis added).
189. See, e.g., Bombrys v. City of Toledo, 849 F. Supp. 1210 (D.N.D.OH 1993); Doe v.
University of Maryland Medical System Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995); Bragdon, 524
U.S. 624.
190. See Bombrys, 849 F. Supp. at 1210. The District Court held that the City of Toledo's
blanket disqualification of persons with insulin-dependent diabetes from employment as
police officers violates the Rehabilitation Act, Title I of the ADA, and the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. See id. at 1221. Citing 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.208(c), the court found that an employer must determine whether a disabled person
poses a direct threat to the health and safety of others on an individualized basis. Id. at
1216.
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others must be significant,' 9' and the determination of significant risk
must be based on objective information. 192
The courts have not ruled directly on the issue of whether the
direct threat doctrine can be used as the basis to discriminate against
an individual with a disability where emergency evacuation from a
public accommodation is the concern. In Fiedler v. American Multi-Cin-
ema, Inc., however, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the issue of whether dispersed wheelchair seating
in a theater creates a "direct threat" to the safety of others in the event
of an emergency evacuation is a triable issue of fact.1 93
Fiedler claimed that the movie theater's decision to locate its en-
tire wheelchair seating in the rear of the theater violates the ADA. 194
By relegating him to inferior seating at the back of the theater, Fiedler
alleged that that the theater deprived him of full and equal enjoyment
of the facilities to which he is entitled under the ADA.' 9 5 He cited
ADAAG1 96 regulations requiring a public accommodation to provide
dispersed seating in assembly areas in support of his claim.1 97 Fiedler
testified that he possesses the strength to roll his wheelchair up the
aisle of the theater and, that when he attends theaters with steeply
191. See Univ. of Maryland Medical System Corp., 50 F.3d at 1261. The court ruled that an
HIV positive neurosurgery resident posed a significant risk to patients that could not be
eliminated by reasonable accommodation and, thus he was not an otherwise qualified indi-
vidual with a disability who could be afforded protection under the ADA. See id. Further,
the court found that the university had conducted an individualized assessment of the
potential threat to others and the available means of mitigating that risk. See id. at 1266. In
a de novo review, the court determined that, because of the dire nature of the risk (HIV is a
fatal disease) and the inability to completely eliminate it by means of reasonable accommo-
dation, the university's action to curtail the surgery privileges of the plaintiff was justified.
Id.
192. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 624. The Court explained that the direct threat provision
of the ADA applies to significant risk to others as can be determined from objective infor-
mation and that risk assessments based on individual beliefs not supported by valid, objec-
tive information are unacceptable. See id. The case concerned an HIV positive patient who
brought an action under the ADA against a dentist who refused to treat her in his office.
See id. The Court noted that, "[b]ecause few, if any, activities in life are risk free .... the
ADA do[es] not ask whether a risk exists, but whether it is significant." Id. at 649. The
Court explained that the existence or nonexistence of a significant risk must be deter-
mined from the standpoint of the person who refuses the treatment or accommodation,
and the risk assessment must be based on objective, scientific information. See id. The
Court then questioned the validity of the information presented in support of the peti-
tioner's position and explained that the views of public health authorities are of special
weight and authority before remanding the case to the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit for further consideration of the risks of infection. See id.
193. 871 F. Supp. 35, 40 (D.D.C. 1994).
194. See id. at 36.
195. See id.
196. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.308(a)(1); see also ADAAG, 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A at 4.33.3.
197. See Fiedler, 871 F. Supp. at 38.
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sloped aisles he is accompanied by a companion who is willing and
able to assist him in the event of an emergency.19 8 The theater opera-
tor argued that dispersed wheelchair seating posed a direct threat to
others during an emergency evacuation because the only wheelchair
accessible evacuation doors were at the rear of the theater, necessitat-
ing wheelchair users to move up the aisles against the flow of crowd
traffic heading for nearer exits in the opposite direction. 99
The Fiedler court distinguished Bombys v. Toledo and Anderson v.
Little League Baseball, Inc.2 °° Unlike those cases, which dealt with poli-
cies, practices, or procedures, Fiedler was concerned with the "struc-
tural amenities" of the theater.2"' The court observed that once
structural modifications have been made to provide reasonable ac-
commodation to Fiedler, those same accommodations would be avail-
able to other people with disabilities regardless of their specific
capabilities. Consequently, the court explained, reasonable accom-
modations addressing Fiedler's claim would make seating accessible to
other disabled people who might pose a "direct threat" to the health
or safety of others. 22 Therefore, the court concluded, the individual-
ized assessment required for Fiedler must be expanded to take evi-
dence to determine if other wheelchair users who may not be as
physically capable or as prudent as Fiedler, will pose a "direct threat"
to the health or safety of others in the event of an emergency and,
whether the theater "can readily achieve an accommodation that
might ameliorate the dangers so posed. 20 3
With this decision the district court revised the rule mandating an
"individualized risk assessment" to require that the assessment encom-
pass other likely beneficiaries of a structural accommodation when de-
termining if the accommodation eliminates the direct threat to the
health or safety of others.
198. See id. at 39.
199. See Fiedler v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 35, 39-40 (D.D.C. 1994).
200. See Fiedler, 871 F. Supp. at 40; See also Bombrys, supra note 189; see also Anderson v.
Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342 (D.Ariz. 1992). The court held that the ADA
demands an individualized assessment of whether a direct threat to the health or safety of
others exists. See Anderson, 794 F. Supp. at 345. The plaintiff was a mobility-impaired per-
son who had successfully coached from his wheelchair for three seasons without incident.
See id. He challenged a policy that banned wheelchair bound people from coaching from
the coaches' boxes. See id. at 344. The defendant was enjoined from implementing the
policy. See id. at 346.
201. See Fiedler, 871 F. Supp. at 40.
202. See id.
203. Id.
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2. "Direct Threat" to the Health or Safety of the Individual with a
Disability
The ADA does not mandate equal access in employment 2 0 4 or in
the provision of programs and services20 5 to persons who pose a "di-
rect threat" to the health or safety of others. Under the ADA, a "direct
threat" means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that
cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or proce-
dures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.
2 0 6
In only a few cases have the courts addressed whether the ADA
"direct threat" doctrine applies to threats to the health or safety of the
disabled person. This issue has arisen most commonly in the context
in which an employer discharges an employee or refuses employment
to an applicant because the employer believes that such employment
poses a "direct threat" to the health or safety of the individual with a
disability. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits have addressed this issue with varied results.2"7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit squarely
addressed the issue of whether the ADA "direct threat" provision ap-
plies to the disabled person in Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc.2" 8 The
principle question considered by the court was whether the "direct
threat" defense available to employers under the ADA applies to em-
ployees, or prospective employees, who pose a direct threat to their
own health or safety, but not to the health or safety of other persons
in the workplace.2" 9 The court found that it did not.
210
204. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1990).
205. 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(a) (2001).
206. 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(b) (2001).
207. See Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 122
S. Ct. 456, 151 L. Ed. 2d 375 (Oct. 29, 2001); Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d
446 (11th Cir. 1996); Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1999).
208. 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 456, 151 L. Ed. 2d 375 (Oct.
29, 2001).
209. See Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1063. The court held that Chevron had discriminated
illegally by denying employment to an applicant because of his disability. See id. at 1072.
The applicant, Echazabal, was required to undergo a pre-employment physical after having
been found qualified for the job in question. See id. The physical examination revealed
liver damage that Chevron's physicians believed would be exacerbated by exposure to the
solvents and chemicals present at the refinery. See id. Chevron rescinded the offer of em-
ployment on the ground that there was a risk that Echazabal's liver would be damaged if
he worked at the job. See id. Three years later, in 1995, Echazabal again applied for em-
ployment with Chevron with the same findings and results. See id. Additionally, Chevron
wrote to the subcontractor, Echazabal's employer, to request that he not be assigned to
work at the refinery. Id. at 1065. Consequently, Echazabal was laid off by his employer. See
id. Chevron defended its action by contending that the direct threat defense includes
threats to one's own health or safety. See id. at 1065-66.
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Conversely, in Koshinski v. Decatur Foundry, Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that an employer may
find that an employee cannot perform the essential functions of ajob
because the performance of those functions will cause the exacerba-
tion of an existing disease.2 1 ' In Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated, with-
out explanation, that the "direct threat" defense applies to threats to
oneself.21 2 The apparent disagreement between the circuits has cre-
ated confusion in the lower courts and industry. The Supreme Court
decision in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazabal should resolve the dispute
over correct interpretation of the ADA "direct threat" doctrine.
IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
The ADA does not clearly address through ADAAG the responsi-
bilities that public and private organizations have for assuring emer-
210. See id. The court found that that the language of the defenses section of Title I of
the statute was unambiguous and, further, that it was supported by the description of di-
rect threat in the definition section of Tide I of the statute. See id. at 1066-67. Both loca-
tions of the statute refer to the "health or safety of other(s)." See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3)
(1990); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.208 (2001). Specifically, the ADA states, in pertinent part,
"[t]he term 'qualification standards' may include a requirement that an individual shall
not pose a direct threat to the health and safety of other individuals in the workplace." 42
U.S.C. § 12113(b). And "[t]he term 'direct threat' means a significant risk to the health or
safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111 (3).
Further, the court rejected Chevron's argument that performing the work at the coker
plant without posing a direct threat to one's own health or safety is an essential function of
the coker unitjob. See Echazaba4 226 F.3d at 1071. The court explained that job functions
are those acts or actions that constitute a part of the performance of thejob. See id. "Were
we to ignore the limits of the actual functions of the job at issue and permit Chevron to
add to those functions any condition it chooses to impose on its written job description,
the term 'essential function' would be rendered meaningless." Id. The court noted that
acceptance of Chevron's argument that Echazabal was not otherwise qualified because he
could not perform the essential functions of the job without risk of injury to himself would,
"by definitional slight of hand, circumvent Congress' decision to exclude a paternalistic
risk-to-self defense in circumstances in which an employee's disability does not prevent him
from performing the requisite work." Id.
211. See 177 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 1999). The case concerned a foundry worker suffering
from degenerative osteoarthritis who was fired after his employer learned that his condi-
tion would be worsened by performing the physically taxing duties of thejob. See id. at 600-
01. Koshinski sued under the ADA. See id. at 601-02. The court cited the EEOC's interpret-
ing regulations in rejecting Koshinski's argument that a direct threat to himself is of no
consequence under the ADA. See id. at 603; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). The court ex-
plained that the direct threat issue only arises after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
of discrimination. See Koshinski, 177 F.3d at 603. The court concluded that because
Koshinski is not an otherwise qualified individual he is not protected under the ADA. See
id. Consequently, the court did not reach the question of whether the foundry had a valid
defense for refusing to reinstate him.
212. See 97 F.3d 446 (11th Cir. 1996).
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gency evacuation of people with disabilities. People with disabilities
are expected to "defend in place" during emergencies because the
courts have not required that they be accorded the same right to
emergency evacuation as non-disabled persons. "Defend in place"
leaves individuals with disabilities and those who remain with them at
increased risk when compared to people who evacuate the danger
area.
Recognition of the increased risk faced by individuals with disa-
bilities during emergencies may lead employers to conclude that the
presence of an individual with a disability in a location where emer-
gency egress is problematic constitutes a "direct threat" to his or her
health or safety. A holding by the Supreme Court in Echazabal that an
employer can deny employment to an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability because performance of the job may pose a "direct
threat" to his or her health or safety, may result in employers denying
work to people with disabilities over concern about their ability to
evacuate during an emergency.
A. ADAAG does not adequately address emergency evacuation requirements
ADAAG does not sufficiently address requirements for the evacu-
ation of people with disabilities during emergencies. Although the
Access Board incorporated ANSI Al17.1 accessibility standards into
ADAAG, those standards reflect the prevalent theories of fire protec-
tion and evacuation of people with disabilities - "defend in place" -
not a requirement for emergency evacuation.213 Consequently,
ADAAG standards do not mandate that public entities or places of
public accommodation provide individuals with disabilities access to
emergency evacuation that is as effective as that provided the able
bodied.
"Defend in place" relies on structural defenses to offer people a
safe haven until rescue professionals arrive.214 In most common fire
situations, "defend in place" does not provide a degree of safety
equivalent to evacuation. Thus, people with disabilities, most particu-
larly the mobility impaired, remain in greater danger during emer-
gencies than do their able bodied counterparts.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in Shirey ex rel. Kyger
v. City of Alexandria comports well with the "defend in place" strategy
espoused by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and
codified by the ICC. The emergency evacuation plan developed by
213. See 36 C.F.R. § 1190.40 (2001).
214. See NFPA ONLINE, supra note 39.
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the school in Shirey incorporated "defend in place" in its operational
design.' 1 5 The plan required disabled students to horizontally evacu-
ate to a safe haven, the library, and await the arrival of rescue workers
before attempting further evacuation. 2 16 Because they were not evac-
uated immediately from the building, this plan put students with disa-
bilities at increased risk when compared to their non-disabled
classmates. t7 While no one would argue with the desirability of im-
mediately evacuating all people, including the mobility impaired, dur-
ing a life-threatening emergency, the NFPA and ICC contend that
technology is not available to achieve it safely.
218
B. Weaknesses of "Defend in Place"
"Defend in place" has certain inherent weaknesses. It is a passive
strategy that relies on fire retardant construction materials to slow the
advance of fire and smoke to afford rescuers time to effect an evacua-
tion. 1 Some individuals may not be suited to waiting helplessly for
rescue. They may try to evacuate independently. This can have tragic
consequences.
In Gomez v. United States, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana chronicled the story of a man evacuated
by his wife from the hospital after a fire started.2 Rather than wait
for the fire to be extinguished or contained, she removed him to a
relative's house where he died of congestive heart failure. 22 ' Deci-
sions to await help, however, can have equally deadly results. In De-
cember of 1998, four able-bodied people died of smoke inhalation in
the West 60th Street Tower in New York City as they tried to exit down
the stairwell.2 22 Others died in Las Vegas' MGM Grand fire in 1980,
215. See Shirey ex rel., Kyger v. City of Alexandria School Bd., 229 F.3d 1143 (Table), No.
99-1127, WL 1198054 (4th Cir. Aug. 23, 2000).
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See NFPA ONLINE, supra note 39; INTERNATIONAL CODE COUNCIL, supra note 38.
219. See NFPA ONLINE, supra note 39.
220. No. 89-2426, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 373 (E.D. La. Jan. 16, 1990). Plaintiff settled
with the construction company whose employee started the fire. See id. When defendant
sued VA hospital, the hospital impleaded construction company who then filed a motion
for summaryjudgment based on its settlement with the plaintiff. See id. The court denied
third party defendant's request for a rehearing of its denial of the motion for summary
judgment. See id.
221. See id.; see also Access Now, Inc., v. Ambulatory Surgery Center Group, LTD., 146 F.
Supp. 2d 1334, 1341 (S.D. Fl. 2001). "Gomez demonstrates the potential liabilities and dan-
gers of unsupervised evacuations ...." Id.
222. See NFPA ONLINE, supra note 45.
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when they decided to stay on the upper floors after hearing the fire
alarm. 2
23
It is difficult to know which course of action is best when faced
with a fire. The National Fire Protection Association warns,
[u]ltimately every individual is responsible for his or her own
safety. Building codes, fire codes, those who enforce such
codes, and building owners all work in harmony to provide a
safe environment, but these collective pieces have inherent
boundaries that they are designed for. This . . . extends to
... those with severe mobility impairments. 224
Because no viable alternatives exist, ADAAG and the ICC man-
date that new construction and building modifications include struc-
tural systems supporting defend in place protection for people with
disabilities.225 The able bodied may have a choice as to whether to
evacuate or defend in place; the mobility impaired do not.
The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center
highlighted the additional risks faced by the\mobility impaired in a
multi-story building emergency. People are discussing the wisdom of
providing mobility-impaired persons with access to the upper levels of
skyscrapers. 226 Yet, high-rise buildings pose safety hazards for every-
one. Anyone who works in a high-rise building assumes a larger risk,
particularly those people with disabilities. 227 The ADA prohibits dis-
crimination against the disabled in employment and access to public
entities and places of public accommodation. 221 Will it be tested in
the context of emergency egress options for the mobility impaired?
"Defend in place" has the inherent drawback of leaving the most
vulnerable people at the mercy of the clock. In "defend in place" the
mobility impaired sit and wait, hoping that rescue will arrive before
the smoke and flames. This can create other problems. The knowl-
edge that mobility impaired people must "defend in place" may tempt
co-workers or others to delay their own evacuation to assist or wait
with the disabled person. This behavior is laudable, but problematic.
Does the presence of the disabled person in a precarious position cre-
ate an unnecessary risk for the able bodied? Should government
mandate safety standards that have the effect of denying access to cer-
tain people with disabilities? Or should people, able bodied and the
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. See id.; see also, 36 C.F.R. § 1190.40 (2001).
226. Albert R. Hunt, Those Suffering Special Stress, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at A27.
227. See id.
228. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
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disabled, be free to choose to live and work in potentially unsafe con-
ditions? How should society manage risk to promote both safe condi-
tions and free choice for all individuals?
These difficult questions appear to force a solution that must de-
value either safety or freedom. Unfortunately, our society has often
chosen to protect individuals with disabilities to the detriment of their
personal freedoms. Safe conditions for all and free choice for most
appears to be the dominant solution.
The concern that people with disabilities are less capable of evac-
uating safely during emergencies has led many communities to imple-
ment protective ordinances that prescribe the conditions under which
persons with disabilities may be housed in their communities.229 This
protective rulemaking stems from the traditional notion that a caring
society should advocate on behalf of disabled people, who are less ca-
pable of achieving parity in the political arena.230 A common by-
product of these paternalistic rules has been discrimination against
persons with disabilities in access to housing.2"' Although the ADA
rendered such discriminatory rules and practices illegal, there is cur-
rently talk of restricting access to high rise buildings for people with
disabilities that may pose a "direct threat" to health or safety during an
emergency evacuation.232
C. Applying "Direct Threat" to Emergency Evacuation of People
with Disabilities
The difficulties of safely evacuating people with disabilities dur-
ing emergencies should not be construed to pose a "direct threat" to
the health or safety of others. Under common law tort doctrine there
exists no duty to aid others in distress absent a special relationship.
While that special relationship exists between employer and employee
and between business operator and customer it may be met via inclu-
sion of provisions for the emergency evacuation of people with disabil-
229. See Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County, Md., 823 F. Supp. 1285,
1294 (D. Md. 1993).
230. SeeS. REP. No. 101-116, at 11 (1989). Former Senator Weicker testified that people
with disabilities spend a lifetime "overcoming not what God wrought but what man im-
posed by custom and law." Id. "The unfortunate truth is that individuals with disabilities
are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations,
subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of
political powerless in our society . . . . " Id. at 15.
231. See, e.g., Buckhannon v. West Virginia Dep't of Health and Human Services, 19 F.
Supp. 2d 567 (N.D. W. Va. 1998); Potomac Group Home Corp. v. Montgomery County,
Md., 823 F. Supp. 1285, 1294 (D.Md. 1993).
232. See Albert R. Hunt, Those Suffering Special Stress, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at A27.
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ities in the organization's emergency plan.233 Moreover, the Supreme
Court strongly suggested in Johnson Controls that federal anti-discrimi-
nation law would preempt such state tort law issues.234 People opting
to assist a person with a disability during an emergency do so volunta-
rily and, consequently, should not create liability for employers or
places of public accommodation.
Despite extensive evidence that Congress did not intend it to be
used as such, the Eleventh Circuit held the "direct threat" defense
under Title I to apply to threats to the individual with a disability.2
35
Should the Echazabal Court affirm this interpretation employers would
be justified in discriminating against people with disabilities vying for
an employment position located in a place not having a ready means
of egress to a public way. Because "defend in place" is inherently risk-
ier than evacuation when that option exists for the able bodied, an
employer could discriminate against people with disabilities in cir-
cumstances where the emergency plan for them is not the same as for
the able bodied. For example, in a building having two or more floors
an employer could restrict people with disabilities from working on
floors where the plan for able bodied people is to use fire stairwells to
escape while the disabled are expected to "defend in place." Accept-
ance of the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation could lead to massive dis-
crimination against people with disabilities in employment and access
to places of public accommodation.
A counter argument, however, is that under Shirey ex rel. Kyger v.
City of Alexandria School Board, employers and public accommodations
need only provide people with disabilities with equal access to an
emergency evacuation plan.236 Consequently, the direct threat is
eliminated when the emergency plan includes procedures for safe-
guarding people with disabilities, even if that plan is inferior to the
safeguards afforded the able bodied.
Should the Echazabal court adopt the Seventh Circuit's Koshinski
interpretation allowing a finding that an employee or job applicant's
inability to perform the essential functions of a job without posing a
"direct threat" to his health or safety renders the individual not other-
wise qualified, it would have little effect on the employability of peo-
233. See Shirey ex reL, Kygerv. City of Alexandria School Bd., 229 F.3d 1143 (Table), No.
99-1127, WL 1198054 (4th Cir. Aug. 23, 2000).
234. See Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
UAW et al., v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 209-10 (1991)).
235. See Moses v. American Nonwovens , Inc., 97 F.3d 446 (11th Cir. 1996).
236. See Shirey ex reL, Kyger v. City of Alexandria School Bd., 229 F.3d 1143 (Table), No.
99-1127, WL 1198054 (4th Cir. Aug. 23, 2000).
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pie with disabilities where emergency evacuation is the issue of
concern. Because emergency evacuation is rarely, if ever, an essential
function of a job, the inability to self-evacuate in an emergency would
not render an individual not otherwise qualified. Consequently,
adoption of the Koshinski theory by the Supreme Court should have
little effect on access to employment for people with disabilities.
D. Impact of the United States Supreme Court's Upcoming Decision in
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazabal
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in Chevron USA, Inc. v.
Echazabal on February 27, 2002, and will issue its ruling sometime in
2002.237 The Court should resolve the split between the Seventh,
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits regarding the applicability of the "direct
threat" defense in situations where the "direct threat" isto the health
and safety of the individual with a disability. At stake is the right of
people with disabilities to decide for themselves whether to accept the
risk to their health and safety posed by a particular employment
opportunity.
What affects will the Court's ruling have on access to employment
and public accommodations when the concern is emergency evacua-
tion of people with disabilities? May an employer refuse to hire a mo-
bility-impaired person because the job is located on a floor requiring
elevator access? May a landlord deny that same individual an apart-
ment on an upper level floor?
The repercussions of the Court's ruling in Echazabal may be
profound. Should the Court affirm the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
banning the "direct threat" defense in all cases involving a "direct
threat" to the health or safety of the individual with a disability, people
with disabilities will achieve decisional equality with other, able-bodied
Americans. A holding by the Court verifying the Eleventh Circuit in-
terpretation of "direct threat" will have a chilling effect on the ability
of people with disabilities to decide independently whether potential
health risks outweigh the financial gain of a particular employment
opportunity. Such a result reinforces the notion that disability and
incapacity are inextricably intertwined.
The Supreme Court should affirm the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit holding and reasoning in Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc.
The Ninth Circuit's finding that absence of risk to one's own health
and safety cannot constitute an essential job function is correct. Oth-
erwise, inherently dangerous jobs would be impossible to fill.
237, Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 456, 151 L. Ed. 2d 375 (Oct 29, 2001).
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Firefighting, for example, is dangerous work. It is not possible for a
firefighter to extinguish fires without being exposed to conditions
that pose a "direct threat" to his or her health or safety. While stan-
dards have been established to assure a level of competence among
firefighters that reduces risk to other firefighters and the public, peo-
ple desiring work as firefighters themselves decide whether to accept
the risk to their own health and safety.
The decisions in Bragdon and Fiedler support the prevailing belief
that the "direct threat" provision relates solely to the notion that other
people should not be needlessly endangered by the presence of a dis-
abled person. 2 8 In Echazabal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit flatly rejected the contention that employers may use the "direct
threat" defense to justify discrimination against people based on the
paternalistic belief that denying employment to the disabled person is
in his or her own best interest.2 3
9
These decisions, and others like them, have at their core an un-
stated understanding that the disabled person is the legal and moral
equivalent of the able-bodied person. When Congress authorized the
ADA it recognized that disability does not equate to diminished capac-
ity.24 0 Consequently, the statute affords to people with disabilities the
same right to decide whether to assume risk as is held by others. In
light of this, perhaps the most significant aspect of the ADA is that it
portends to convey to the disabled person the right to decide whether
to assume the risks inherent in ajob, public program or public accom-
modation, in the same manner as other, able-bodied people.
Congress' recognition that paternalistic beliefs lead to discrimina-
tion against disabled people provides strong support for an interpreta-
tion limiting the direct threat defense to threats to the health or safety
of others. The Echazabal court concluded with the following words:
"Conscious of the history of paternalistic rules that have often ex-
cluded disabled individuals from the workplace, Congress concluded
that disabled persons should be afforded the opportunity to decide
for themselves what risks to take."24 1 The wisdom of this belief is be-
ing tested in the aftermath of September 11.242
238. SeeBragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998); Fiedler v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc.,
871 F. Supp. 35 (D.C. 1994).
239. See Echazabal, 226 F.3d at 1072.
240. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 7 (1989). "[O]ur society is still infected by the ancient, now
almost subconscious assumption that people with disabilities are less than fully human and
therefore are not fully eligible for the opportunities, services, and support systems which
are available to other people as a matter of right." Id.
241. Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2000).
242. See Albert R. Hunt, Those Suffering Special Stress, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at A27.
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Alternatively, affirmation of the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation
may at best lead to paternalistic denial of employment to people with
disabilities by employers concerned with the welfare of employees and
applicants for employment. Acceptance of the rationale that the "di-
rect threat" defense includes threats to the health or safety of the indi-
vidual with a disability, as the EEOC interpretation proclaims,
provides employers with a powerful sword to deny employment oppor-
tunities based on the mere probability of future harm.
Such harm may carry increased expense for employers. Fears
that future injuries may result in downtime, increased health benefit
costs, or workers compensation claims may encourage some employ-
ers to withhold employment in contravention of the purposes of the
ADA. It is simply naive to believe that some employers will not act out
of self-interest to deny people with disabilities employment opportuni-
ties. Finally, such an interpretation of the "direct threat" defense is
counter to the underlying principles of Johnson Controls and Arline.
The Seventh Circuit holding in Koshinski seems at first to provide
a middle ground. Upon closer inspection, however, this interpreta-
tion, which initially denies employers the "direct threat" defense when
the threat is to the individual with a disability but then allows a deter-
mination that the disability renders the individual "not otherwise qual-
ified" and outside the protection of the ADA, is in reality a backdoor
device enabling employers to discriminate wantonly. As the Echazabal
court correctly discerns, this logic renders. "essential function" mean-
ingless and circumvents Congress' intent in creating the legislation.24
E. "Direct Threat" In The Aftermath of September 11
The terrorist attacks on September 1 1 took America by surprise.
Many are wondering what could have been done to prevent them or,
failing that, to minimize the casualties.244 Some of the actions being
discussed, however, would improve our sense of security at the cost of
diminished liberties.245
These circumstances are worrisome for people with disabilities.
They fear that hard won rights to equal access may be sacrificed in the
243. See Echazabal, 213 F.3d at 1071-72.
244. See CNN Access, Solicitor General. Proposals will not violate rights, CNN.coM/U.S. (Sep-
tember 25, 2001) at http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/25/rec.olson.cnna/html.
245. Ellie Phillips, Congress Debates Security v. Civil Liberties, PCWorld.COM (October 2,
2001) available at http://www.pcworld.com/resource/printable/article/O,aid,64424,
O0.asp.
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name of safety and security.2 4 6 There is already discussion about the
wisdom of allowing the mobility-impaired access to high-rise build-
ings. 247 Fears about emergency evacuation of the mobility impaired,
and the danger to those who attempt to rescue them may lead to a
resurgence of paternalistic rulemaking.
Disabled people understand the risks they face in high-rise build-
ings.248 Heightened risk is a fact-of-life for people with disabilities.2 49
The mobility-impaired are at greater risk, as compared to the able
bodied, when crossing the street, for example: as are the visually im-
paired, hearing impaired, and developmentally disabled. When a
driver runs a red light, the disabled person is at a relative disadvantage
in recognizing and/or avoiding the danger: yet, not crossing the street
is not an acceptable solution.
People with disabilities readily accept the risks that accompany
equal access to programs and services.25 ° More importantly, Congress
and the courts have recognized that equality of access only truly exists
when the decision of whether to accept the risks that accompany that
access is left to the disabled individual.2 51  Restricting access in the
well intentioned, yet paternalistic belief that to do so is necessary to
protect the disabled person has been held to be illegal discrimination
under the ADA.25 2 This understanding may be threatened in the near
future by the Supreme Court decision in Chevron USA, Inc., v.
Echazabal. The Court's decision may profoundly affect the liberty ex-
ercised by people with disabilities to decide what risks they will take.
Current technology limits the options available to protect people
with disabilities during emergencies. The "defend in place" strategy
employed for all people in most high-rise fires is generally accepted as
the safest plan to protect disabled people in almost all multi-story
building emergencies. 253 Although it is arguably the best solution
practicable, "defend in place" leaves mobility-impaired people at the
246. See Albert R. Hunt, Those Suffering Special Stress, Editorial, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2001,
at A27.
247. See id.
248. See Hunt, supra note 81; see also McKee, supra note 3.
249. See Hunt, supra note 81.
250. See id.
251. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); see also UAW, et al., v. Johnson
Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991); Echazabal v. Chevron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir.
2000).
252. See, e.g., Kohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D.Il. 1996); Echazabal,
226 F.3d at 1063.
253. See NFPA ONLINE, Strategies in Building Evacuation Messages (Oct. 19, 2001) at http:/
/www.nfpa.org/BuildingCode/BuildingEvacuation/building-evacuation.asp (on file with
the author).
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mercy of the clock.25 4 This knowledge can take an emotional toll on
people with disabilities and their co-workers and friends, and conse-
quently, may endanger the lives of able-bodied people attempting to
assist the mobility-impaired during an emergency.
Policy-makers have at least three possible courses of action re-
garding emergency evacuation of disabled persons in multi-story
buildings: do nothing; restrict access of mobility impaired people to
upper level floors; or develop safe methods for evacuating the mobil-
ity impaired during emergencies. People with disabilities favor option
three.255 Concerted efforts by the public and private sectors may re-
sult in new technology and procedures that "give the disabled an
equal chance at staying alive." '256
People with disabilities, their advocates, and government leaders
should focus their efforts to create environments that do not place
people with disabilities at unnecessary risk. Regulatory agencies and
building managers should examine current evacuation procedures to
make best use of existing technology. Those responsible for planning
and executing emergency evacuations should work to improve aware-
ness in the general population, including people with disabilities, of
fire safety and emergency evacuation strategies. Continued study to
develop technology capable of saving lives in emergencies is a moral
prerogative and should be aggressively pursued.257 The Access Board
should specify evacuation requirements in the ADAAG and coordi-
nate state-of-the-art strategies with the ICC. Lastly, continued vigi-
lance is required of all to assure that people with disabilities are not
forgotten when emergency plans are drawn or executed.
V. CONCLUSION
Neither the ADA nor its implementing regulations specifically ad-
dress the right of people with disabilities to safe evacuation during
emergencies.25 s Judicial interpretation of the ADA has reinforced the
notion that people with disabilities are not afforded equal rights to
emergency evacuation under the ADA. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held in Shirey v. City ofAlexandria School
254. See Barbara McKee, Local Comment: Don't leave disabled behind, DETROIT FREE PRESS
(Oct. 18, 2001) at http://www.freep.com/voices/columnists/emckeel8_20011018.htm.
255. See id.
256. See McKee, supra note 3.
257. See id.
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
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Board that the ADA does not guarantee equal access to emergency
evacuation - only equal access to an evacuation plan.260 Conse-
quently, the Fourth Circuit views the scope of the ADA as not encom-
passing true equality of access in this potentially life threatening area.
Although today's buildings are constructed to conform to
ADAAG guidelines, those guidelines support the "defend in place"
strategy of fire and emergency protection of individuals with disabili-
ties. "Defend in place" leaves persons with disabilities in danger even
as able-bodied people evacuate the danger area. Recent recognition
of the danger posed to persons with disabilities by the inherent weak-
nesses of "defend in place," combined with the lack of viable alterna-
tives to it, has sparked discussion of restricting access for individuals
with disabilities to places where emergency evacuation is problematic.
The upcoming Supreme Court decision in Chevron USA, Inc. v.
Echazabal may determine if employers can use the "direct threat" doc-
trine of the ADA to defend such action. The better solution to this
legal and moral dilemma is development of new technologies to facili-
tate safe evacuation of people with disabilities during emergencies;
planning that incorporates the new technology; and enhanced aware-
ness of the need to consider people with disabilities in the emergency
egress planning process.
In this time of national challenge we would be wise to consider
the prescient words of United States Supreme CourtJustice Thurgood
Marshall, "History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in
times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to
endure." '261 Ultimately, the true strength of American democracy may
be evidenced through courage marshaled in the face of adversity to
protect the cherished liberties that define America.
Political fallout from the recent carnage at New York City's World
Trade Center may embody challenges to the liberties afforded dis-
abled persons by the ADA. People with disabilities and their support-
ers need to be prepared to defend their hard won rights.
259. See Shirey ex rel Kyger v. City of Alexandria School Bd., 229 F.3d 1143 (Table), No.
99-1127, WL 1198054 (4th Cir. Aug. 23, 2000).
260. See id.
261. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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